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Advances in technology have greatly increased the ways a lawyer
might interact with clients and potential clients. These advances have mul-
tiplied the avenues of communication. For example, lawyers of today can
communicate by email with clients or potential clients' and also have all
the possibilities the internet offers for communicating in writing, pictures
or video.' Advances in technology also have made it possible for lawyers
and potential clients to interact virtually. For example, a lawyer might have
a website upon which a potential client might access a questionnaire. The
potential client, without the actual knowledge of the attorney responsible
for the website, but with the attorney's general knowledge of the website
and questionnaire, might respond to the questionnaire by disclosing all
sorts of information.'
Does the attorney-client privilege apply to those disclosures? Does
the attorney, for purposes of professional responsibility, owe duties of con-
fidentiality or loyalty or care to the people responding to the question-
naires? Might the disclosures create a basis for disqualification of the
attorney in future matters? Might the attorney owe the people responding
* Bernard Flexner Professor of Law and Distinguished Teaching Professor, University of
Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
1. There was a time when ethics opinions warned against the use of such risky modes of com-
munication as email or cellphones. See, e.g., Iowa Ethics Op. 97-1 (1997) (lawyers should not use email
as a means of communication for sensitive information unless the client is given written notice of the
confidentiality risk); Ill. Ethics Op. 90-07 (1990) (mobile phones are not private so lawyers should not
use them to communicate with clients).
2. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-457 (2010) (dealing with
lawyer websites and cautioning lawyers about the application of advertising rules and also cautioning
lawyers about creating prospective client relationships via the website). See also Catherine Lanctot,
Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 151-55
(1999) (discussing the technology of 1999 with regard to the formation of attorney-client relationships).
3. This scenario occurred in Barton v. U.S. Dist. Court, 410 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005).
The world of Barton is far removed from the world of the late 1880s when the New York firm
of Sullivan & Cromwell finally obtained a telephone ten years after telephones became availa-
ble. See Lanctot, supra note 2, at 164. The firm thought the device beneath it. "'At first it was
considered unprofessional for a lawyer to have a telephone. Some lawyers were also distrust-
ful of the privacy afforded by the instrument."' Id. at 165 n. 44 (quoting JOHN FORSTER DUL-
LES, FORWARD TO ARTHUR H. DEAN, WILLIAM NELSON CROMWELL 1854-1948 27-28 (1957)).
For a discussion of the formation of the attorney-client relationship as the result of other
creatures of the advanced technology world, see Judy M. Cornett, The Ethics of Blawging: A
Genre Analysis, 41 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 221, 249 (2009) (discussing blawging); Caroline D. Bud-
densick, Current Development 2008-09, Risks Inherent in Online Peer Advice: Ethical Issues
Posed by Requesting or Providing Advice Via Professional Electronic Mailing Lists, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 715, 718 (2009) (discussing electronic mailing lists); Adrienne E. Carter, Blog-
ger Beware: Ethical Considerations for Legal Blogs, 14 RiCH. J.L. & TECH. 5, 40 (2007) (dis-
cussing legal blogs).
319
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
to the questionnaires a duty of care such that the attorney could be liable
for malpractice?
Advances in communication technology also have altered how the
practice of law occurs. The questionnaire scenario is a great example of
how lawyers and clients can find each other and interact in ways not
imagined in years past. Communications advances have altered the prac-
tice in a myriad of other ways as well. For example, because transfer of
documents and written communication is so fast and seamless, it is possible
to have lawyers in Mumbai work on a project for a New York lawyer who is
servicing a client based in New York.4 The advent of computers and the
communications changes that have come along with them were unimagin-
able in the early 1980s when a law firm partner was heard to exclaim that
lawyers did not need computers on their desks because lawyers had no
need to type!s
The American Bar Association (ABA) has struggled to have its Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) keep pace with this rapidly-
changing environment. A significant modification to the Model Rules oc-
curred in 2002 when the ABA introduced Rule 1.18, a rule expressly recog-
nizing for the first time the relationship of an attorney and a prospective
client.' Rule 1.18 defines this new inhabitant to the analytical framework,
the prospective client,' and expressly provides that a lawyer owes such an
entity duties of confidentiality and loyalty of a limited nature.' Indeed, a
comment to Rule 1.18 suggests that a lawyer owes a prospective client a
duty of competence as well. 9 While the recognition of the concept of a
prospective client could have occurred in the pre-technological environ-
ment of, for example, the 1960s, the variety of attorney-client interactions
possible in the age of the internet was perhaps a catalyst to a more nuanced
approach to attorney-client relationship evaluation which includes the pos-
sibility of a prospective client.
Since the introduction of Rule 1.18, the world has not stood still but
rather advances in technology have continued to increase the possible in-
teractions between attorneys and clients. In 2012 the ABA adopted several
amendments to the Model Rules in an attempt to incorporate the realities
of the current world in which lawyers and clients and potential client com-
municate. As a result of the plethora of contact possibilities, the recent
4. A new comment to Rule 1.1 addresses some of the issues that arise in the context of out-
sourcing. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (2012). See also ABA Comm. on Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008) (dealing with issues presented by the outsourcing of legal
work).
5. For a discussion of the multitude of ways the practice of law is different because of the exis-
tence of computers, see Richard L. Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession: Evolu-
tion or Revolution?, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1827 (2008).
6. See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Client or Prospective Client: What's the Difference?,
27 CRIM. JUST. 51 (Fall 2012) ("Until the ABA enacted Model Rule 1.18 in 2002, the Model Rules did
not recognize the status of 'prospective client."').
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.18(a) cmt. 2 (2012).
8. See id. R. 1.18 (b), (c), & (d).
9. See id. R. 1.18 cmt. 9.
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changes to the Model Rules, and the more nuanced analysis possible with
Model Rule 1.18's recognition of the prospective client entity, the time has
come for, to use a technology-based word, a "reboot" with regard to how
the profession thinks about the formation of all levels of attorney-client
relationships and the contexts and circumstances in which lawyers owe du-
ties to others.
Traditionally, the Model Rules have dealt with duties lawyers owed to
clients. The Model Rules did not delve into the question of the formation
of the attorney-client relationship, the point at which a party became a cli-
ent, but recognized the duties a lawyer owed if the party was or had been a
client-if there was or had been an attorney-client relationship.'o The
question of whether the relationship existed such that the duties contained
in the Model Rules attached has been a question beyond the reach of the
Model Rules." As paragraph seventeen of the Scope section of the Model
Rules states, "for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and re-
sponsibility, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine
whether a client-lawyer relationship exists." 2
Historically, regardless of the context in which the question has arisen,
courts have treated the issue of the existence of an attorney-client relation-
ship as a zero-sum matter." Though a few courts perhaps were more dis-
criminating,14 most courts saw only two possible conclusions: either there
was an attorney-client relationship or there was no attorney-client relation-
ship. As a result, there was no recognition that duties might be owed to a
party who was not yet a client but who was moving toward being a client if
the relationship never ripened into a full attorney-client relationship.
Rather, courts, limited analytically by the binary framework, forced situa-
tions into one of the two categories. This is not to say that courts never
found an attorney-client relationship in what, under Rule 1.18's teachings
10. Rule 1.7, for example, has long addressed conflicts involving current clients while Rule 1.9
has addressed conflicts involving former clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.7, 1.9
(2012).
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Scope 17 (2012). See also In re Carter, 733 S.E.2d
897 (S.C. 2012) (a discipline case in which the state Office of Disciplinary Counsel looked to state case
law as to whether an attorney-client relationship had been formed such that duties attached). See also
Susan R. Martyn, Accidental Clients, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 919 (2005) ("Nearly all lawyer code
provisions assume that a professional relationship has been established, but do not explain how that
occurs. General legal principles found in contract and tort law fill this gap.").
12. Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct, Scope 17 (2012).
13. In Vodak v. City of Chicago, No. 03 C 2463, 2004 WL 783051. at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16 2004).
the court applied the attorney-client privilege to questionnaires completed by people seeking legal rep-
resentation. The court concluded, "an attorney-client relationship existed at the time the question-
naires were completed." See also Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1997) (finding a lawyer-
client relationship after an in-person consultation).
14. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978)
("The fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client extends to preliminary consultation by a
prospective client with a view to retention of the lawyer, although actual employment does not re-
sult."). See also United States v. Stiger. 413 F.3d 1185, 1196 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting duties regarding a
prospective client); Green v. Montgomery County, 784 F. Supp. 841, 845 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (quoting
Westinghouse and agreeing that a lawyer may owe a prospective client duties; applying Rule 1.9 to
disqualify lawyer).
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might be a situation involving a prospective client. Rather, some courts in
such situations found an attorney-client relationship such that all duties
owed a client attached."
In determining the existence or lack of an attorney-client relationship,
courts have stated various approaches. As the Scope section to the Model
Rules states, "Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relation-
ship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal
services and the lawyer has agreed to do so."1 6 Consistent with this state-
ment, courts have looked to the existence of a contractual relationship to
supply duty and obligation." In addition, courts have often stated that the
test for the existence of an attorney-client relationship turns on the reason-
able belief of the possible client." Some formulations have been phrased
to turn on factors such as whether the possible client has disclosed confi-
dential information to the lawyer19 or whether the lawyer has rendered
legal advice to the possible client.2 0
With the advent of Rule 1.18, the ABA introduced expressly the con-
cept of the prospective client and provided that a lawyer owes duties of
competence, confidentiality, and loyalty to such a person or entity, though
perhaps not to the same extent those duties are owed to a client.2 ' With
the 2012 refining amendments, Rule 1.18 now no longer defines a prospec-
tive client as"[a] person who discusses with a lawyer about the possibility of
forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter." 22 Rather,
Rule 1.18 defines a prospective client as "[a] person who consults with a
15. See, e.g., Lovell, 941 S.W.2d at 468 (finding a lawyer-client relationship after an in-person
consultation); Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) (finding a lawyer-
client relationship after an in-person consultation).
16. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct Scope 17 (2012).
17. See, e.g., Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1004 (W.D. Wash.
2007) (noting that the beginning of the analysis is the relevant engagement agreement).
18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Lustyik, No. 2:12-CR-645-TC, 2012 WL 6574425. at *8 (D. Utah
Dec. 17 2012) ("For example, the client's conduct alone can form an attorney-client relationship if she
provides confidential information to the attorney."); Pro-Hand Servs. Trust v. Monthei, 49 P.3d 56
(Mont. 2002) (holding that if the possible client disclosed confidential information, an attorney-client
relationship existed).
20. See, e.g., Bohn v. Cody, 832 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1992) ("The essence of the attorney/client rela-
tionship is whether the attorney's advice or assistance is sought and received on legal matters."); Allen
v. Steele, 252 P.3d 476, n.7 (Colo. 2011) ("An attorney-client relationship may be 'inferred from the
conduct of the parties,' such as when 'the client seeks and receives the advice of the lawyer on legal
consequences of the client's past or completed actions."' (quoting People v. Bennett, 810 P.2d 661. 664
(Colo. 1991)). See also Ingrid A. Minott, The Attorney-Client Relationship: Exploring the Unintended
Consequences of Inadvertent Formation, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 269, 281-82 (2009) (discussing the
rendering of legal advice as an indicator of relationship).
21. For example, Rule 1.18 disqualifies a lawyer on the basis of a prospective client only if the
lawyer has received "significantly harmful" information even if the matter is the "same or a substan-
tially related matter" to that involving the contact with the prospective client and the lawyer seeks to
represent a party with interests "materially adverse" to the prospective client. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.18(c) (2012). Rule 1.9 disqualifies a lawyer on the basis of a former client upon a
showing that the matter is the "same or a substantially related matter" to that involving the contact with
the former client and the lawyer seeks to represent a party with interests "materially adverse" to the
former client. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2012).
22. Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 1.18(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
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lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with re-
spect to a matter." 23 Comment 2 contains a broad outline of some of the
possible avenues of consultation, recognizing technological communication
possibilities by making clear that a traditional in-person 24 or telephonic
conversation between an attorney and a potential client is not a require-
ment for the occurrence of a consultation and therefore the existence of a
prospective client to whom duties are owed.25
In addition, Comment two to Rule 1.18, as revised in 2012, suggests an
approach to the analysis to be used to determine when a party is a prospec-
tive client and thus when a lawyer owes duties to a party who is not yet a
client and may never become a client. Comment two to Rule 1.18 posits
expressly in part and implicitly otherwise that the reasonable and good
faith belief of the client as to the nature of the relationship with the lawyer
should be controlling. The suggested analysis is not contract-based because
it cannot be; parties simply do not contract to be prospective clients.
Rather, the focus is on the possible client's honest and reasonable view of
nature of the relationship between the attorney and the possible client. It
is, however, consistent with fiduciary notions of the relationship as consen-
sual but not necessarily contractual.2 6 Indeed, the suggested approach is
not different in word from many statements already in use. 2 7 Yet, the state-
ment in the comment may very subtly encourage courts to more fluidly
consider the existence of relationships and be broader in terms of what can
be a consensual relationship.
Rule 1.18, as amended in 2012, may positively affect the way all stages
of attorney-client relationships are judged. The obvious and most basic
change is that the concept of the prospective client is incorporated into any
professional responsibility issue in which there is a question of relation-
ship.2 8 In addition, it is very likely that courts will incorporate the concept
of a prospective client into any disqualification analysis because in the past
courts have been greatly influenced by the Model Rules in making disquali-
fication decisions.29 Third, it is possible that the concept of the prospective
23. Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 1.18(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
24. See Martyn, supra note 11, at 919 ("The typical case that comes to mind involves a prospec-
tive client who sits down with a lawyer, discusses a legal matter, and hires the lawyer to proceed.").
25. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.18 cmt. 2 (2012).
26. The lawyer-client relationship is an agency relationship; the lawyer is the agent of the client
principal. The agency relationship carries with it the duty for the agent to act solely in the interest of the
principal and translated to the attorney-client relationship, the overarching duty includes duties of con-
fidentiality and loyalty. See Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Lawyer Codes Are Just About Licensure, The Law-
yer's Relationship with the State: Recalling the Common Law Agency, Contract, Tort, Trust, and
Property Principles that Regulate the Lawyer-Client Fiduciary Relationship, 60 BAYLOR L. REv. 771, 784
(2008). "An agency is not a contract." Id. at 804. The formation of an agency does not require, for
example, "the exchange of consideration." Id. at 804.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part V. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 932 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 2010) (private reprimand
for disclosure of confidential information of a former prospective client).
29. See infra Part V. See, e.g., DOCA Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., LLC, No. 04-1951, 2012
WL 5877580 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2012); State v. S.J., No. FO-01-138-12. 2012 WL 4855943 (N.J. Super.
Oct. 15, 2012).
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client will also affect courts' analysis of malpractice liability.3 0 Because
Rule 1.18 recognizes that a lawyer owes a duty of confidentiality to a pro-
spective client, courts may in the future not conclude that the sharing of
information creates a full attorney-client relationship. Likewise, Rule 1.18
recognizes that a lawyer owes a duty of competence to a prospective client.
Thus, courts in the future may not conclude that a lawyer who provides
legal advice automatically becomes a client as a result. Indeed, the recogni-
tion of the prospective client may eliminate, in many situations, a need for
a determination of full attorney-client relationship since the key duty at
issue may be sufficiently implicated upon a finding that the party is a pro-
spective client.
A more global but less tangible potential result of Rule 1.18 and the
age of advanced technology is an overall broadening of the thinking about
the formation of an attorney-client relationship and duties that an attorney
might owe in a particular situation. Rule 1.18 creates an environment in
which contract notions and hard-edged categories of relationships may be
less important; context and circumstances matter, even if delineations and
categorizations are not possible. Rule 1.18 in general and the discussion of
when a possible client might be a prospective client in particular invites an
open analysis of all sorts of circumstances. This discussion makes clear that
the honest and reasonable belief of the possible client as to the relationship
with the lawyer is of utmost importance. The discussion makes clear that
the question is the consensual nature of the relationship given the particu-
lar circumstances, not necessarily the existence of a contract or contract-
like situation.
A circumstance and context driven approach to determining when a
lawyer owes duties to anyone, client or otherwise, is consistent with attor-
ney-client privilege law. Courts have always recognized that the applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege does not depend on the existence of a
contract or even an attorney-client relationship. Rather, courts have ap-
plied the privilege when a possible client communicated with a party the
possible client reasonably believed to be an attorney for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice.3" Thus, the privilege has applied regardless of a rec-
ognizable attorney-client relationship. Attorney-client privilege law has
also used a reasonable belief analysis with regard to confidentiality. If the
party seeking legal advice reasonably believes the communication is confi-
dential the privilege applies.32
30. See infra Part V. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn.
1980). But see Allen v. Steele. 252 P.3d 476 (Colo. 2011) (malpractice liability requires the existence of
a contractual relationship).
31. See infra Part VI. See, e.g., United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 523 (D. Del. 1981)
(privilege applied if person reasonably believed that one consulted was a lawyer).
32. See infra Part VI. See, e.g., United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 610 (9th Cir. 2009) (privi-
lege applied if person reasonably believed the communication was confidential).
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This article continues in Section II with a discussion of Rule 1.18, its
comments, and its 2012 amendments. In Section III the treatment prospec-
tive clients receive in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Law-
yers is reviewed. Section IV discusses courts' treatment of the question of
the existence of an attorney-client relationship along with the Restatement's
view of the formation of the attorney-client relationship. In Section V the
article discusses the changes Rule 1.18 as amended may create. Section VI
discusses how a more flexible approach is consistent with attorney-client
privilege law. The article concludes in Section VII that Rule 1.18, when
paired with rapidly-changing technology that multiplies opportunities and
varieties of attorney and client interaction, should lead to a flexible view of
relationships and duties owed.
II. RULE 1.18
The ABA added Model Rule 1.18 in 2002." Before the introduction
of Rule 1.18, the Model Rules had no provision addressing a lawyer's inter-
action with a party who sought to be represented by the lawyer but who
was not yet in an attorney-client relationship with the lawyer.3 4 In 1990 the
ABA issued Formal Opinion 90-358 which provided guidance for dealing
with some of the issues Rule 1.18 addressed but not until 2002 did the pro-
spective client concept become a part of the Model Rules.
The version of Rule 1.18 adopted in 2002 provided that "[a] person
who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer rela-
tionship with respect to a matter is a prospective client."36 The Rule then
recognized that an attorney has a duty to protect "information learned in
the consultation" to the same extent that a lawyer has a duty to protect a
former client's information.
In addition, since its inception Rule 1.18 has imposed a duty of loyalty
on the attorney who has dealt with a prospective client. Rule 1.18(c) pro-
vides that a lawyer is prohibited from representing "a client with interests
materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substan-
tially related matter" if the prospective client has shared information with
the lawyer that "could be significantly harmful to" the prospective client."
The Rule provides a process for screening the lawyer who had received the
information.39
While not in the text of the Rule, comment nine to Rule 1.18 speaks to
a duty of competence owed to a prospective client. Comment nine states
33. See Legislative History of Model Rule 1.18, in STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDs 214 (concise ed. 2012).
34. See id. (discussing the Reporter's Explanation Memo that accompanied the Ethics 2000 Com-
mittee proposal suggesting Rule 1.18). See also Joy & McMunigal, supra note 6 ("Until the ABA en-
acted Model Rule 1.18 in 2002, the Model Rules did not recognize the status of 'prospective client."').
35. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (1990).
36. Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 1.18(a) (2012).
37. Id. at R. 1.18(b).
38. Id. at R. 1.18(c).
39. Id. at R. 1.18(d).
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that one should consult Rule 1.1, the rule requiring lawyer competence,40
with regard to "a lawyer who gives assistance on the merits of a matter to a
prospective client. 4 1 Also, comment one to Rule 1.18 specifically notes that
a prospective client may rely on a lawyer's advice.42 The implication of
comments nine and one is that a lawyer owes a prospective client a duty of
competence.
In 2012, the ABA amended Rule 1.18. The ABA Commission on Eth-
ics 20/20 noted, in explaining the rationale for amending Rule 1.18:
When a lawyer's first substantive contact with a potential
client was face-to-face, it was relatively easy to determine
when a communication gave rise to a prospective client-law-
yer relationship. Now such a relationship can arise in many
different ways: a lawyer's website might ask a person to
send information about his injury; a lawyer might exchange
information with someone on a blog; and a lawyer might use
her social networking page to provide advice to "friends." 43
In order to clarify when a prospective client and attorney relationship
might arise in all circumstances, including situations involving electronic
communications, amendments to Rule 1.18 were proposed and adopted by
the ABA in August of 2012. In particular, Rule 1.18's definition of a pro-
spective client was modified to eliminate that a prospective client is one
who "discusses" the possibility of representation with a lawyer. Rather, the
amended version of Rule 1.18(a) now states: "A person who consults with a
lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to
a matter is a prospective client." 44
In its effort to not have lawyer-client interactions thought of in tradi-
tional ways, the ABA modified Rule 1.18(b) as well, removing a mention of
"discussions" and "consultation" in the provision dealing with the duty of
confidentiality. The ABA rewrote section (b) of Rule 1.18 to state that a
lawyer owes a duty of confidentiality to a prospective client if that lawyer
has "learned information from" the prospective client.45 The confidential-
ity duty owed was not modified. The lawyer owes the prospective client
the same duty of confidentiality as the lawyer owes to a former client.4 6
40. Rule 1.1 states: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation." Id. at R. 1.1.
41. Id. at R. 1.18 cmt. 9.
42. Id. at R. 1.18 cmt. 1.
43. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Introduction and Overview (2012), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics2020/20120508ethics2020-final-hod-
introdutionandoverview-report.authcheckdam.pdf.
44. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R.1.18(a) (2012). Rule 1.18(b) and the comments
were also slightly modified to be more consistent with the notion of a consultation rather than a discus-
sion. Id. at R. 1.18(b).




The ABA also modified comments one, four, and five to bolster its
effort to broaden the notions of lawyer-client interaction at play in the rule.
In comment one the word, "discussions" was eliminated and replaced with
"consultations." 4 7 in comment four a reference to "the initial interview"
was deleted and replaced with "the initial consultation."4 8 And finally, in
comment five a reference to "conversations" was eliminated and replaced
with a reference to "a consultation." 49
Perhaps the most significant amendment is a substantial rewriting of
comment two to Rule 1.18. Comment two deals with the determination of
whether a party is a prospective client-in other words, whether there is a
prospective client and attorney relationship. Comment two, as amended,
states:
A person becomes a prospective client by consulting with a
lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer rela-
tionship with respect to a matter. Whether communica-
tions, including written, oral, or electronic communications,
constitute a consultation depends on the circumstances. For
example, a consultation is likely to have occurred if a law-
yer, either in person or through the lawyer's advertising in
any medium, specifically requests or invites the submission
of information about a potential representation without
clear and reasonably understandable warnings and caution-
ary statements that limit the lawyer's obligations, and a per-
son provides information in response. See also Comment
[4]. In contrast, a consultation does not occur if a person
provides information to a lawyer in response to advertising
that merely describes the lawyer's education, experience, ar-
eas of practice, and contact information, or provides legal
information of general interest. Such a person communi-
cates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any rea-
sonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the
possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, and is
thus not a "prospective client." Moreover, a person who
communicates with a lawyer for the purpose of disqualifying
the lawyer is not a "prospective client."5 0
This comment makes clear that the focus of analysis for the existence of a
prospective client and lawyer relationship is the possible client's "reasona-
ble expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of form-
ing a client-lawyer relationship."5
47. Model Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.18 cmt. 1 (2012).
48. Id. at cmt. 4.
49. Id. at cmt. 5.
50. Id. at cmt. 2.
51. Id.
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In addition, the last sentence of the comment clarifies that the person
must honestly be seeking representation by the attorney. Communication
with an attorney might create a "reasonable expectation that the lawyer is
willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship" but
if the possible client's purpose is not an honest effort to secure the attor-
ney's services, the possible client is not a prospective client for purposes of
the Rule 1.18.52
This comment is subtly important because it describes a process in
which a person could become a prospective client though the circumstances
are far from the "give-and-take" that one might assume has to be present
for the formation of a relationship. In a more traditional setting a client
pursues legal advice and representation from an attorney in an in-person
conversation. The lawyer then consents to the representation and the at-
torney-client relationship is formed. Or the lawyer consents to consider
accepting the person as a client and thus a prospective client and lawyer
relationship is formed. Comment two makes clear that a consensual rela-
tionship can be formed without what many might think of as a traditional
consent. 53 Rather, if a lawyer sets up a communications portal that invites
certain information about potential representation, and if the lawyer does
not place clear warnings on the portal to clarify that no relationship of any
sort results from the use of the portal, then a relationship of a consensual
sort can be recognized in the absence of a traditional "give-and-take."
III. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS
AND PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers treats pro-
spective clients very similarly to Model Rule 1.18, recognizing duties of
confidentiality, loyalty, and care. Section fifteen of the Restatement, like
Rule 1.18, recognizes that lawyers owe duties to prospective clients.54 The
Restatement embraces the reality that "[p]rospective clients are like clients
in that they often disclose confidential information to a lawyer, place docu-
ments or other property in the lawyer's custody, and rely on the lawyer's
advice." 5 A comment to section fifteen notes that disclosure of confiden-
tial information may be necessary even though no attorney-client relation-
ship exists or forms.56
52. Id.
53. In Dwyer v. Binegar, 95 So. 2d 565, 571 (La. Ct. App. 2012), in a malpractice context, the
court concluded its description of the formation of an attorney-client relationship with the following:
"an attorney client relationship cannot exist in the absence of any initial communication-verbal, writ-
ten, or otherwise-between an attorney and the client." This statement may reflect a narrower view of
possible interactions.
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15 (2000).
55. Id. at cmt. b.
56. See id. at cmt. c (It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal and for the lawyer to
learn confidential information (see § 59) during an initial consultation prior to their decision about
formation of a client-lawyer relationship. For that reason, the attorney-client privilege attaches to com-
munications of a prospective client (see § 70, Comment c). The lawyer must often learn such informa-
tion to determine whether a conflict of interest exists with an existing client of the lawyer or the
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Like Rule 1.18, section fifteen recognizes that a lawyer may owe duties
to a prospective client. Section fifteen recognizes a duty of confidentiality
by stating that a lawyer owes a person who "discusses with a lawyer the
possibility of their forming a client-lawyer relationship for a matter and no
such relationship ensues"" a duty not use or disclose confidential informa-
tion unless use or disclosure would be permitted for information of a client
or former client." Section fifteen also recognizes that the lawyer has a
duty to protect the person's property if the lawyer has custody of that prop-
erty.5 9 Section fifteen expresses a duty of loyalty and confidentiality in
terms of disqualification almost identical to Rule 1.18 as well, providing for
disqualification when the interests of a client are "materially adverse" to a
prospective client, the matter is "the same or a substantially related mat-
ter," and the prospective client conveyed to the lawyer "confidential infor-
mation that could be significantly harmful to the prospective client."6 0
Finally, section fifteen of the Restatement, more forcefully than Rule
1.18, recognizes that a lawyer owes a prospective client a duty to "use rea-
sonable care to the extent the lawyer provides the person legal services.""
Comment e to section 15 explains that a lawyer might render legal advice
of a sort to a prospective client though no attorney-client relationship yet
exists. For example, a lawyer
might comment on such matters as whether the person has a
promising claim or defense, whether the lawyer is appropri-
ate for the matter in question, whether conflicts of interest
exist and if so how they might be dealt with, the time within
lawyer's firm and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. In all instances, the
lawyer must treat that information as confidential in the interest of the prospective client, even if the
client or lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation (see Subsection (1)(a); see also § 60(2)).
The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be and regardless of whether screen-
ing is instituted under Subsection (2)(a)(ii). The exceptions to the principles of confidentiality and privi-
lege apply to such communications (see §§ 61-67)).
57. Id. at § 15(1). See also section fifteen comment one, which states in part: "This Section sum-
marizes the duties of a lawyer to a person seeking legal services. Duties attach even when no client-
lawyer relationship ensues." Id. at cmt. 1.
58. See id. at § 15(1)(a).
59. See id. at § 15(1)(b).
60. Id. at § 15(2). Section 15(2) states:
A lawyer subject to Subsection (1) may not represent a client whose interests are materially
adverse to those of a former prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter
when the lawyer or another lawyer whose disqualification is imputed to the lawyer under
§§ 123 and 124 has received from the prospective client confidential information that could be
significantly harmful to the prospective client in the matter, except that such a representation
is permissible if:
(a) (i) any personally prohibited lawyer takes reasonable steps to avoid exposure to confi-
dential information other than information appropriate to determine whether to re-
present the prospective client, and (ii) such lawyer is screened as stated in § 124(2)(b) and
(c); or
(b) both the affected client and the prospective client give informed consent to the repre-
sentation under the limitations and conditions provided in § 122.
61. Id. at § 15(1)(c). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 51(1) (2000).
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which action must be taken and, if the representation does
not proceed, what other lawyer might represent the pro-
spective client.62
Thus, posits comment e, an attorney must use reasonable care; prospective
clients reasonably might rely on such advice. In particular, comment e
states: "Depending on the circumstances, the burden of removing ambigui-
ties rests with the lawyer, particularly as to disclaiming conclusions that the
client reasonably assumed from their discussion, for example whether the
client has a good claim."6 3
The Restatement thus supports Rule 1.18 in terms of recognition of
duties owed to prospective clients. Unfortunately, however, section fifteen
of the Restatement is written in terms of the duties attaching when "a per-
son discusses with a lawyer the possibility of their forming a client-lawyer
relationship."6 4 As Rule 1.18 as amended moves forward without the
more-limiting word, "discusses," the Restatement, using the word, "dis-
cusses," may be less encouraging of the recognition of prospective client
and attorney relationships and less encouraging of a broad notion of con-
sensual relationships in general.
IV. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF AN ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
A. The Courts
Without the concept of the prospective client for purposes of analysis,
courts of the past have sought to categorize situations as ones in which
there was an attorney-client relationship and all duties were owed or situa-
tions in which the party was a nonclient to whom the lawyer owed no du-
ties.6 5 For example, Knigge v. Corvese6 6 is a case in which the concept of a
prospective client could have been most helpful if available to the court.
Faced with the question of whether an attorney should be disqualified from
participating in the matter before the court, the court analyzed the matter
as one involving an attorney-client relationship or no relationship. In
Knigge, an attorney had in place a prerecorded telephone message that
stated the nature of the attorney's practice and his rates.6 7 The message
also stated that the attorney had no staff so the mode of interaction was the
voice mail system. 68 The lawyer's message asked callers to "leave enough
62. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 15 cmt. e (2000).
63. Id.
64. See id. at § 15(1).
65. See, e.g., Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1997) (finding a lawyer-client relationship
after an in-person consultation). Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980)
(finding a lawyer-client relationship after an in-person consultation). See generally Minott, supra note
20 (discussing various approaches to determining the existence of an attorney-client relationship); Mar-
tyn, supra note 11 (discussing courts' approaches as contract-based or tort-based).
66. See Knigge v. Corvese, No. 01 Civ. 5743(DLC), 2001 WL 830669 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2001).




information so that I will have an idea about the nature of your call."69
The party seeking the attorney's disqualification left five or six voice mails
with the lawyer. Once, said the party, the attorney spoke to him in per-
son.70 After the opposing party engaged the attorney as an expert witness,
the party who had contacted the attorney moved to disqualify him." The
court ultimately determined that the party was not in an attorney-client
relationship with the lawyer.72
In addition to being a good example of a court deciding between the
two options, recognizing an attorney-client relationship with all comcomi-
tant duties and recognizing no relationship, the Knigge case is also helpful
in providing an example of how courts have framed the analysis. The
Knigge court's statements with regard to the existence of an attorney-client
relationship are enlightening. The court stated:
The formation of an attorney-client relationship 'hinges
upon the client's [reasonable] belief that he is consulting a
lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek
professional legal advice."' . . . Formality is not, however,
"an essential element in the employment of an attor-
ney." . . . Instead, courts must "look at the words and con-
duct of the parties." . . .Courts have considered several
factors in determining whether an attorney-client relation-
ship exists, including whether a fee arrangement was en-
tered into or a fee was paid, whether a written retainer
exists, whether the attorney actually represented the indi-
vidual, for example at a deposition, or performed legal ser-
vices for the individual, and whether the purported client
reasonably believed that the attorney was representing
him.... A party's "unilateral belief" that he is represented
by counsel "does not confer upon him the status of client
unless there is a reasonable basis for his belief." . . . "To
establish a fiduciary or implied attorney-client relationship,
the possible client must show that he submitted confidential
information to a lawyer with the reasonable belief that the
lawyer was acting as his attorney.""
While the statement seems to say that a potential client's reasonable belief
as to the relationship is important, the court notes some very traditional
factors to consider and phrases the question as a question of "employment
of an attorney."7 4 Employment of an attorney is a phrase with a decidedly
contractual air to it-perhaps a more stringent requirement that a finding
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *2.
72. Id. at *3.
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. Id.
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of consensual relationship. Then again, the last sentence of the quoted
statement sounds like there can be no relationship absent the sharing of
confidential information. One can speculate that the passage is a mash-up
of statements made in many cases over the years. On the basis of this pas-
sage, however, it is hard to determine how a court should judge a relation-
ship. Is it one test or a bundle of tests?
Another example of analysis is in Lovell v. Winchester.7 s In Lovell
two parties claimed that an attorney representing the opposing party
should be disqualified because the attorney met with them before becom-
ing counsel to the opposing party. There was no dispute that the lawyer
met with the parties once and that the parties left original land transaction
documents with the lawyer. The lawyer then declined the representation
and returned the documents.7 6 In finding an attorney-client relationship,
the court stated:
Consultation with a lawyer may ripen into a lawyer/client
relationship that precludes the lawyer from later undertak-
ing a representation adverse to the individual who consulted
him. The lawyer/client relationship can arise not only by
contract but also from the conduct of the parties. Courts
have found that the relationship is created as a result of the
client's reasonable belief or expectation that the lawyer is
undertaking the representation. Such a belief is based on
the conduct of the parties. The key element in making such
a determination is whether confidential information has
been disclosed to the lawyer.7
This statement also seems to say that the analysis hinges on the reasonable
belief of the possible client as to whether the lawyer is agreeing to the
representation but then the last quoted sentence says that the "key" is
whether the person has disclosed confidential information to the lawyer. Is
the disclosure of confidential information essential in all situations or is it
essential only when the question is disqualification. As is true with the
Knigge passage, this passage from Lovell makes it difficult to determine
how to evaluate relationships.
Other statements, especially from the malpractice context, are even
more limiting. Some courts simply refuse to entertain the possibility of mal-
practice liability absent a contractual relationship.78 For example, in Ma-
cawber Engineering, Inc. v. Robson & Miller,79 the court stated that to
succeed on a legal malpractice action under Minnesota law, the plaintiff
must prove the existence of an attorney-client relationship because the
75. See Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1997).
76. Id. at 467.
77. Id. at 468.
78. See, e.g., Macawber Eng'g, Inc. v. Robson & Miller, 47 F.3d 253 (8th Cir. 1995); Allen v.
Steele, 252 P.3d 476 (Colo. 2011).
79. Macawber, 47 F.3d at 255.
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duty of care results from that relationship.so The court continued that "an
attorney-client relationship is established when the parties enter an express
or implied contract of representation or when an individual seeks and re-
ceives legal advice under circumstances which would lead a reasonable per-
son to rely on the advice.""
In Berry v. McFarland,8 2 the Idaho Supreme Court evaluated the exis-
tence of an attorney-client relationship in the context of an action for
breach of fiduciary duty." The court stated:
As a general rule, no attorney-client relationship exists ab-
sent assent by both the possible client and attorney. . .. If
the attorney agrees to provide assistance, or engages in con-
duct that could reasonably be construed as so agreeing, then
there is an attorney-client relationship. The scope of the
representation depends upon what the attorney has agreed
to do.84
And in Rosenbaum v. White," an action involving a malpractice claim
among others, the court stated:
However, there must be evidence of a consensual relation-
ship, existing only after both the attorney and client have
consented to its formation. . . . One way that Indiana courts
have held that an implied attorney-client relationship exists
is when "[a]n attorney has consented to the establishment of
an attorney-client relationship[,] there is proof of detrimen-
tal reliance, [and] the person seeking legal services reasona-
bly relies on the attorney to provide them and the attorney,
aware of such reliance does nothing to negate it.""6
80. Id. at 255-56.
81. Id. at 256.
82. Berry v. McFarland, 278 P.3d 407, 408 (Idaho 2012).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 411.
85. Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2010).
86. Id. In the context of determining whether a party was a joint client of an attorney for pur-
poses of attorney-client privilege, the court in Sky Valley Ltd. Partnership v. ATX Sky Valley, Ltd., 150
F.R.D. 648 (N.D. Cal. 1993), applied a contract-based view of the formation of the attorney-client
relationship. The court stated:
It is appropriate to focus on what a party in the given circumstances would reasonably have
inferred because in legal theory the attorney-client relationship can be formed, at least for
purposes of determining whether a party was, over time, a joint client of the same lawyer with
another party, only by contract, express or implied.
Id. at 651. However, the court provided that the reasonable belief of the possible client considering all
circumstances, was the determinative factor. Id. at 652-53. In E2Interactive, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network,
Inc., No. 09-CV-629-SLC, 2010 WL 1981640 (W.D. Wis. May 17, 2010), the court stated:
"The attorney client relationship is contractual and subject to the same analysis as other con-
tract formation questions." . . . The attorney-client relationship may be informal and implied
from the word and actions of the parties.. .. Whether and when an attorney client relationship
exists depends on the contractual intent and conduct of the parties.
Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
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Some courts have placed special emphasis on disclosure of confidential
information, stating that a disclosure of confidential information creates an
attorney-client relationship." Other courts have emphasized that the ren-
dering of legal advice creates the relationship."
Perhaps one of the most confusing statements regarding determining
the existence of an attorney-client relationship is the statement in Capitol
Surgical Supplies, Inc. v. Casale,8 9 in which the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit summarized Pennsylvania law:
In this case, it is undisputed that there was no express con-
tract between Capitol and Casale for legal services. There-
fore, Capitol had to establish the existence of an implied
attorney-client relationship. An implied attorney-client re-
lationship is shown if (1) the purported client sought advice
or assistance from the attorney; (2) the assistance sought
was within the attorney's professional competence; (3) the
attorney expressly or impliedly agreed to provide such assis-
tance; and (4) it is reasonable for the putative client to be-
lieve that the attorney was representing him. . . . A request
for legal services, and an agreement to provide legal ser-
vices, are necessary elements to form an attorney-client
relationship.90
The message from this collection of statements about the formation of
an attorney-client relationship is that there is a tremendous amount of vari-
ation about what seems to matter. Some courts may be seeking a contract,
express or implied, rather than seeking evidence of a consensual relation-
ship. These statements with their various factors of importance also illus-
trate a perhaps narrow focus on the possible circumstances that can suffice
to evidence such a relationship. For example, given that the Lovell court
87. See, e.g., Diversified Group, Inc. v. Daugerdas, 139 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("To
establish a fiduciary or implied attorney-client relationship, the putative client must show that he sub-
mitted confidential information to a lawyer with the reasonable belief that the lawyer was acting as his
attorney."); Black Rush Mining, LLC v. Black Panther Mining, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1090 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (In a disqualification matter, the court stated: "An implied attorney-client relationship may be
demonstrated in the absence of an express agreement if a party shows (1) that it submitted confidential
information to a lawyer, and (2) it did so with the reasonable belief that the lawyer was acting as the
party's attorney."); United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1196 (10th Cir. 2005) (In a disqualification
case the court stated: "To show that an attorney-client relationship existed, Mr. Stiger ... need only
'show that (1) [he] submitted confidential information to a lawyer and (2) [he] did so with the reasona-
ble belief that the lawyer was acting as [his] attorney."') (citation omitted).
88. See, e.g., Knigge v. Corvese, No. 01 Civ. 5743(DLC), 2001 WL 830669, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July
23, 2001) (noting as a factor whether the lawyer ever performed legal services for the person); Ma-
cawber Eng'g, Inc. v. Robson & Miller, 47 F.3d 253, 256 (8th Cir. 1995) ("an attorney-client relationship
is established when the parties enter an express or implied contract of representation or when an indi-
vidual seeks and receives legal advice under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to
rely on the advice"). See also Lanctot, supra note 2, at 168 (discussing forming an attorney-client rela-
tionship by giving legal advice).
89. Capitol Surgical Supplies, Inc. v. Casale, 86 F. App'x 506, 507 (3d Cir. 2004).
90. Id. at 508 (citation omitted). See also Lefta Assocs. v. Hurley, 902 F. Supp. 2d 559 (M.D. Pa.
2012) (quoting Capitol, 86 F. App'x at 508).
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stated that the "key" for the creation of an attorney-client relationship was
the disclosure of confidential information," could a person be a client with-
out disclosure of confidential information if the person "had a reasonable
belief or expectation that the lawyer [was] undertaking the representa-
tion?"9 2 Or is such a belief unreasonable absent the sharing of confidential
information?
B. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers on the
Formation of the Attorney-Client Relationship
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers attempts to
outline the methodology for determining whether there is an attorney-cli-
ent relationship. Section fourteen of the Restatement provides:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that
the lawyer provide legal services for the person; and either
(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so,
and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the ser-
vices; or
(2) a tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to
provide the services.93
Comment a to section fourteen clarifies that "the various duties of lawyers
and clients do not always arise simultaneously" and that a lawyer may owe
duties to a prospective client.94
In terms of the nature of the analysis, comment a provides that
"[a]gency and contract law are also applicable, except when inconsistent
with special rules applicable to lawyers."95 The comment notes that the
relationship is "consensual""6 but also states that "when a lawyer has not
communicated willingness to represent a person, a client-lawyer relation-
ship arises when the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide ser-
vices, and the lawyer, who reasonably should know of this reliance, does
not inform the person that the lawyer will not do so."" The comment
notes that in some situations the lawyer may be seen to have impliedly
consented while in others "the lawyer's duty arises from the principle of
91. Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Ky. 1997).
92. Id.
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §14 (2000).
94. Id. at cmt. a.
95. Id.
96. Id. at cmt. b.
97. Id. at cmt. e.
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promissory estoppel, under which promises inducing reasonable reliance
may be enforced to avoid injustice." 98
This provision is helpful in that it focuses on the formation of the at-
torney-client relationship as manifestations of a consensual relationship. 99
However, providing that a lawyer can be bound without a manifestation of
consent but with reasonable reliance by the potential client and reasonable
notice to the attorney 00 perhaps muddies the water unnecessarily. Indeed,
as the comment notes, as justification, this section reaches across doctrines
to promissory estoppel. 01 Unfortunately, promissory estoppel is not a
great fit here since the doctrine of promissory estoppel requires a prom-
ise. 10 2 It seems that if a lawyer's actions or inaction can justify a finding of
promise, that action or inaction could be the basis for a finding of a mani-
festation of consent. A broad, more fluid notion of what can comprise a
manifestation of consent on the part of the lawyer, one suggested by
amended Rule 1.18 and its comments, could perhaps be more useful.
V. THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF RULE 1.18
There is no doubt that Rule 1.18 and its amendments will be influential
with regard to professional responsibilities owed to prospective clients; the
Rule is the controlling standard. Lawyers owe duties of confidentiality,
loyalty and competence to prospective clients and will be subject to disci-
pline for failing with regard to these duties."0 ' The broad language in Rule
1.18's comment two about the formation of the prospective client and law-
yer relationship encourages analysis that considers the totality of circum-
stances and context in determining whether duties are owed for purposes
of professional responsibility.
Likewise, the more open view of attorney-client relationships present
in rule 1.18 as amended also should be influential in disqualification mat-
ters. Courts over the years very often have used the Model Rules as gui-
dance when deciding disqualification matters though the Model Rules are
not controlling.104 In the days before the existence of Rule 1.18 and its
98. Id. The comment refers to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §90 (1979). This provi-
sion deals with the contractual notion of promissory estoppel. See id.
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS §14(1)(a) (2000).
100. See id. at §14(1)(b).
101. See id. at §14 cmt. e.
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §90 (1979). Section 90 states:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbear-
ance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under Subsection (1) without
proof that the promise induced action or forbearance.
103. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Cicero, 982 N.E.2d 650 (Ohio 2012) (attorney suspended
one year for disclosure of confidential information of a prospective client); In re Anonymous, 932
N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 2010) (private reprimand for disclosure of confidential information of a former pro-
spective client).
104. See, e.g., Reese v. Va. Int'l Terminals, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Va. 2012) (referring to
Rules 1.7 and 1.10); Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (W.D. Wash. 2007)
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introduction of the prospective client concept, courts' analyses regarding
motions to disqualify often involved determining whether a party and an
attorney were105 or had even beenlO6 in an attorney-client relationship. If a
court determined that the party was a client or had been a client, Model
Rule 1.7 or Model Rule 1.9 provided guidance about whether a disqualifi-
cation was appropriate.
In the time since the introduction of the prospective client concept and
the conflict principles for prospective clients in Rule 1.18(c) and (d), courts
have incorporated the teachings of Rule 1.18 into disqualification analy-
sis. 10 7 These courts have used the instruction of Rule 1.18 to identify pro-
spective clients and have applied the conflict of interest principles of Rule
1.18 as well. Because, other than Rule 1.18, there is no body of substantive
law regarding the existence of a prospective client, Rule 1.18 and its com-
ments, especially comment two as amended in 2012, can be particularly
influential. The lack of prior statements of law regarding prospective cli-
ents may allow the analysis of the existence of a prospective client to exist
without uncomfortable ties to contract law principles or unfortunate state-
ments of tests and factors. Perhaps the analysis used will be that of com-
ment two-a focus on the honest and reasonable belief of the possible
client as to the relationship with the attorney but not a focus on the exis-
tence of an implied contractual relationship oron the existence of particular
factors. The courts' use of Rule 1.18's prospective client analysis perhaps
will preclude courts from applying tests of attorney-client relationship in
many cases because the courts will not need to establish a full attorney-
client relationship.1 0 8
A recent example of the impact of Rule 1.18 in the disqualification
context is In re Marriage of Perry.109 In a divorce matter, a wife had three
telephone conversations with the attorneys who eventually represented her
husband. The court used Rule 1.18 to determine that the wife had been a
(referring to Rules 1.7, 1.9, & 1.10): Krutzfeldt Ranch, LLC v. Pinnacle Bank, 272 P.3d 635, 641 (Mont.
2012) (referring to Rules 1.7, 1.9, & 1.10 and stating, "While violation of a rule of professional conduct
is not alone sufficient to justify disqualification of counsel, it serves as 'additional weight that may tip
the scales in favor of disqualification."' (quoting Schuff v. A.T. Klemens & Son, 16 P.3d 1002 (Mont.
2000))).
105. See, e.g., Krutzfeldt Ranch, 272 P.3d at 641.
106. See, e.g., Avocent, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1001; Pro-Hand Servs. Trust v. Monthei, 49 P.3d 56
(2002).
107. See, e.g., DOCA Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., LLC. No. 04-1951, 2012 WL 5877580 (W.D.
Pa. Nov. 20, 2012); In re Persaud, 467 B.R. 26 (E.D.N.Y. Bankr. 2012); Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Apco-
power, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 896 (W.D. Mich. 2009); In re Marriage of Herridge, 279 P.3d 956 (Wash.
App. 2012); State ex rel. Thompson, 346 S.W.3d 390, 396 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011): 0 Builders & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Yuna Corp. of NJ, 19 A.3d 966 (N.J. 2011).
108. A court not finding a prospective client relationship certainly need not evaluate the existence
of an attorney-client relationship. In many disqualification cases, finding a prospective client relation-
ship will provide all necessary guidance on the disqualification question. In those few cases in which a
court finds at least a prospective client relationship but Rule 1.18 does not counsel in favor of disqualifi-
cation because the possible client disclosed no "significantly harmful" information to the attorney, a
court might have reason to take the additional step of deciding whether the possible client is or was in
fact in an attorney-client relationship with the attorney.
109. In re Marriage of Perry, No. DA 11-0704, 2013 WL 160266, at *5 (Mont. Jan. 15, 2013).
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prospective client of the husband's counsel and acknowledged that Rule
1.18 provides that a lawyer owes duties to a prospective client though there
is no traditional attorney-client relationship.'o Ultimately, the court did
not disqualify the husband's attorney because the wife did not share signifi-
cantly harmful information with the attorney."' The disqualification anal-
ysis focused not on the existence of a lawyer-client relationship but rather
on the existence of a prospective client and lawyer relationship and then
used Rule 1.18 for the source of the standard of disqualification. In deter-
mining the nature of the relationship, perhaps courts of the future will also
applied the broad, context and circumstances analysis suggested by com-
ment two to Rule 1.18.
Rule 1.18 may also affect courts in their determination of malpractice
liability. Comment one to Rule 1.18 acknowledges that lawyers may give
prospective clients advice.112 Comment nine suggests that a lawyer owes a
prospective client a duty of competence.' 13 In light of these statements,
courts could be more willing to accept that a lawyer may give legal advice
to a prospective client and not convert that party to a client. Courts could
determine that lawyers are responsible to prospective clients for malprac-
tice if advice given prospective clients is below the appropriate standard of
care.
For example, in Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe,1 4 a court
evaluated whether an attorney might be liable for malpractice. A woman
had met with an attorney about possible claims she and her husband might
have related to medical care her husband had received. The woman said
that the attorney told her that "he did not think we had a legal case, how-
ever, he was going to discuss this with his partner."' She did not hear
from the attorney for a few days and so she concluded that "they had come
to the conclusion that there wasn't a case."' 6 Later she discovered that
she and her husband had claims but the statute of limitations had run." 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that there was a lawyer-client
relationship,"s that the lawyer had rendered legal advice," 9 and that a
jury could find that the attorney had been negligent in rendering that ad-
vice. 1 20 The Togstad court, speaking in 1980, long before Rule 1.18 and the
express recognition of the prospective client concept, found an attorney-
client relationship in a situation that today a court might very well conclude
involved a prospective client and attorney relationship. The Togstad
court's willingness to recognize a lawyer-client relationship and malpractice
110. Id. at *5-6.
111. Id. at *6.
112. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.18 cmt. 1 (2012).
113. See id. at cmt. 9.
114. Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.w.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 1980).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 694.
118. Id. at 693.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 694.
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liability indicates that modern courts might be willing to recognize malprac-
tice liability in prospective client situations today.
Other courts may not be so amenable and may see malpractice as a
separate matter. 12 1 For example, in Allen v. Steele,12 2 a lower court dis-
missed a claim for legal malpractice and negligent misrepresentation. 123
The plaintiffs claimed that the attorney provided them incorrect informa-
tion about a statute of limitations and as a result they did not file a matter
in a timely fashion.124 The plaintiffs appealed the negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim.125 The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs stated a claim
though there was no attorney-client relationship between the plaintiffs and
the defendant attorney. 1 26 The plaintiffs relied on the Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers section 15 which states that lawyers owe
prospective clients a duty of care.127 The Colorado Supreme Court re-
versed.128 The court stated that "[i]n Colorado, attorneys 'do not owe a
duty of reasonable care to non-clients,' including prospective clients....
An attorney may be liable for legal malpractice only if the plaintiff has
proven the existence of an attorney-client relationship."1 29 The court then
noted that the Rule 1.18 of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct
provide that a lawyer owes a prospective client only the duty of confidenti-
ality and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest.'3 0 The Allen court acknowl-
edged that the Restatement in section fifteen provides that an attorney owes
a duty of care to a party who is not a client but stated,
[The Restatement] imposes liability for malpractice in the absence of
an attorney-client relationship, which contravenes Colorado law. . . . the
distinction between a client and a prospective client is fundamental to Col-
orado law. In Colorado, attorneys do not owe a duty of reasonable care to
non-clients-either for legal malpractice or under the ethical rules. . . . A
plaintiff must establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship to
state a claim of legal malpractice.
121. See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2012) (in malpractice action court
found no attorney-client relationship and refused to consider duties under the Rules of Professional
Conduct in a prospective setting).





127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §15 (2000). See also supra
the discussion of section 15 of the Restatement in section III.
128. Allen, 252 P.3d at 480.
129. Id. at 482 (quoting Mehaffy, Rider, WIndholz & Wilson v. Cent. Bank Denver, 892 P.2d 230,
240 (Colo. 1995)).
130. Id. at 482. Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.18 comment 9 does not contain the
reference to the duty of competence included in the Model Rules version of comment 9. The Colorado
rule mentions a duty of care or competence only with regard to valuables and papers entrusted to the
lawyer and dealt with in Rule 1.15. See COLORADO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18 cmt. 9.
131. Id. at 485 (citation omitted).
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VI. CONSISTENCY WITH ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ANALYSIS
The generally-accepted understanding of the attorney-client privilege
is that the privilege protects confidential communications between an at-
torney and a client if the purpose of the communications is the obtaining or
rendering of legal advice.1 32 The attorney-client privilege has long been
recognized to apply even when a party who seeks to become a client but is
not yet a client makes the disclosures. The existence of an attorney-client
relationship has never been a requirement for application of the privi-
lege. 13 3 For example, a famous and often-quoted description of the privi-
lege is that in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,134 which states
that the "privilege applies only if . .. the asserted holder of the privilege is
or sought to become a client.""' A recent statement of this idea is in Bar-
ton v. United States District Court for the Central District of California.13 6
The Barton court stated:
There is nothing anomalous about applying the privilege to
such preliminary consultations. Without it, people could not
safely bring their problems to lawyers unless the lawyers
had already been retained. "The rationale for this rule is
compelling," because "no person could ever safely consult
an attorney for the first time with a view to his employment
if the privilege depended on the chance of whether the at-
torney after hearing his statement of the facts decided to
accept the employment or decline it." 3 7
132. See PAUL R. RICE, ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES §2:1 (database
updated June 2012); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §2292 554
(John. T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (the attorney-client privilege applies "(1) where legal advice of
any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived").
See also New Jersey v. Sprint Corp., 258 F.R.D. 421, 425 (D. Kan. 2009); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.,
501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (E.D. La. 2007). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW Gov-
ERNING LAWYERS §§68-86 (2000).
133. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir. 1994) (the
privilege applies when the "asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client"); In re
Auclair. 961 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1992) ("No person could ever safely consult an attorney for the first time
... if the privilege depended on the chance of whether the attorney after hearing the statement of facts
decided to accept employment or decline it."); United States v. Buitrago-Dugand, 712 F. Supp. 1045,
1048 (D.P.R. 1989) ("It is imperative that the privilege attach soon after the prospective client has
contacted an attorney, and certainly no later than the point at which the person reveals facts tending to
establish a criminal exposure.").
134. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
135. Id. at 358-59.
136. Barton v. U.S. Dist. Court. 410 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005).
137. Id. at 1111 (quoting People v. Gionis, 892 P.2d 1199, 1205 (1995)). See also Factory Mut. Ins.
Co v. APCom Power, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 896, 899 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (quoting Banner v. City of Flint,
99 F. App'x 29, 36 (6th Cir. 2004) ("the Sixth Circuit recognizes that '[w]hen a potential client consults
with an attorney, the consultation establishes a relationship akin to that of an attorney and existing




The Barton court was evaluating a claim of privilege regarding disclosures
made by parties completing questionnaires by way of a lawyer-sponsored
website. The website stated that no attorney-client relationship was cre-
ated by consulting the website and providing information with the ques-
tionnaire. The court determined that such a statement did not defeat
application of the attorney-client privilege to communications made by way
of the website because the privilege can attach before an attorney-client
relationship is formed and even if an attorney-client relationship never
forms."3 s The Barton court stated: "'Prospective clients' communications
with a view to obtaining legal services are plainly covered by the attorney-
client privilege under California law, regardless of whether they have re-
tained the lawyer, and regardless of whether they ever retain the law-
yer."l 39 Thus, Rule 1.18's recognition that lawyers owe prospective clients
professional responsibility duties is consistent with attorney-client privilege
analysis.140
In addition, the analysis of whether the attorney-client privilege ap-
plies in a particular setting has always turned on the reasonable belief of
the party making disclosures in an effort to obtain legal advice. As the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Te-
cum,141 stated,
In some aspects of the law of attorney-client privilege, the
client's reasonable beliefs may be relevant. For example,
courts have found the privilege applicable where the client
reasonably believed that a poseur was in fact a lawyer, rea-
sonably believed that a lawyer represented the client rather
than another party, or reasonably believed that a conversa-
tion with a lawyer was confidential, in the sense that its sub-
stance would not be overheard by or reported to anyone
138. Barton, 410 F.3d at 1111.
139. Id. See also Pucket v. Hot Springs School Dist. No. 23-2, 239 F.R.D. 572, 579-80 (D.S.D.
2006) (if parties seek legal advice and reasonably believe the lawyer with whom they communicate
represents them, the attorney-client privilege can apply even though no attorney-client relationship
actually exists or develops).
140. In United States v. Gumbaytay, 276 F.R.D. 671 (M.D. Ala. 2011), an entity sent a form letter
inviting the recipient to contact a person regarding possible sexual harassment, a violation of the Fair
Housing Act, by a rental agent. Id. at 678. The individual to whom the letter recipients were directed
was a paralegal. The court was asked to determine whether the notes of the paralegal's conversations
with letter recipients who called in were privileged. The court stated: "The callers contacted CAFHC to
explore the possibility of raising potential Fair Housing Act claims, whether or not they . . . ultimately
agreed to be represented. Preliminary consultations of this kind are protected by the attorney-client
privilege." Id. at 689. See also United States v. Bennett, No. CR609-067, 2010 WL 4313905, at *4 (S.D.
Ga. 2010) ("This conversation has all of the hallmarks of the typical initial meeting between a lawyer
and a potential client. Such conversations-preliminary to entering into a formal representation agree-
ment-are clearly protected by the attorney-client privilege."). See also Vodak v. City of Chicago, No. 03
C 2463, 2004 WL 783051 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16 2004),(privilege applied to questionnaires completed by
people seeking legal representation by people they reasonably believed were lawyers).
141. In re Grand Jury Subpocna Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105
(1997).
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else. All these situations involve, in essence, reasonable mis-
takes of fact.142
Courts have held that if the party had an honest and reasonable belief
that the person to whom disclosures were made was a lawyer, the commu-
nication can be privileged.1 43 In United States v. Rivera,1 44 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York stated,
It is common ground among the parties that the attorney-
client privilege attaches to confidential communications
made to an individual in the genuine, but mistaken, belief
that he is an attorney. (citations omitted) Accordingly, it is
irrelevant for the purposes of this motion that Rivera was
not an attorney, since the parties agree that his clients were
operating under the mistaken belief that he was.14 5
Likewise, in Dabney v. Investment Corp.,146 the court stated that the privi-
lege could apply if "the client is genuinely mistaken as to the attorney's
credentials." Unfortunately, the client in Dabney was not "genuinely mis-
taken" because at the time of the communication the client knew that the
142. Id. at 923 (footnotes omitted).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 745 F. Supp. 423, 425 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (privilege applied if
person reasonably believed that cellmate was a lawyer); United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 523
(D. Del. 1981) (privilege applied if person reasonably believed that one consulted was a lawyer);
United States v. Mullen, 776 F. Supp. 620, 621 (D. Mass 1991) ("the attorney-client privilege may apply
to confidential communications made to an accountant when the client is under the mistaken, but rea-
sonable, belief that the professional from whom legal advice is sought is in fact an attorney"). In Finan-
cial Technologies Int'l, Inc. v. Smith, No. 99 CIV 9351 GEL RLE, 2000 WL 1855131 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
2000), the court faced a claim that the privilege should apply to communications between a corporate
client and a person who was not a lawyer but had been employed as the client's in-house counsel The
court stated:
On balance, the Court finds these sources compelling and is of the opinion that an individual
who reasonably believed that the person consulted was a duly admitted attorney should be
afforded a measure of protection. The alternative would require individuals to check the back-
ground of a prospective attorney to insure that they were confiding with a "real" attorney. The
inherent delay in such a process might well deprive the person of effective counsel at a time
when advice is most valuable.
Id. at *6. The court then concluded that the corporate claimant before it must at the least investigate
the background of the individual it seek to employ as in-house counsel to confirm the individual's status
as a lawyer. See id. at *6-7. See also United States v. Gumbaytay. 276 F.R.D. 671, 679 (M.D. Ala. 2011)
("'The privilege should fairly turn on the client's reasonable perception of whether she is dealing with a
person who appears to be authorized to provide legal advice"' (quoting Boca Investing P'ship v. United
States, No. 97-602, 1998 WL 426564 (D.D.C. June 9 1998)). See generally Rice, supra note 132, at
§ 3:13: Wigmore, supra note 132, at 584 ("The theory of the privilege clearly requires that the client's
bona fide belief in the status of his adviser as an admitted attorney should entitle him to the privilege.
No doubt an intention to employ only such a person is necessary, as well as a respectable degree of
precaution in seeking one. But from that point onward he is entitled to peace of mind, and need not
take the risk of deception or of the defective professional title.").
144. United States v. Rivera. 837 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
145. Id. at 568 n.1.
146. Dabney v. Inv. Corp.. 82 F.R.D. 464, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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person had not been admitted to any bar.147 Some states have incorpo-
rated the reasonable belief standard of the status of the lawyer by rule. For
example, some states define "lawyer" as that term is used in the privilege
statute as "a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be
authorized to engage in the practice of law in any state or nation." 48
Another setting in which privilege law uses the honest and reasonable
belief of the party in the position of client or possible client as the touch-
stone is when there is a question as to the confidential nature of the com-
munication. If the party communicating with the lawyer honestly and
reasonably believes that the communication is confidential, then the privi-
lege applies.149 For example, in United States v. Ruehle,150 Ruehle, the
Chief Financial Officer of a corporation claimed that he thought his com-
munications with the corporation's attorneys were confidential. Because
Ruehle knew before the conversation with the attorneys that the informa-
tion uncovered by the attorneys would be disclosed to the corporation's
independent auditors, the court determined that Ruehle did not establish
that he had an honest and reasonable belief that the communications were
confidential. 151
VII. CONCLUSION
When the flexible analysis of Rule 1.18 as amended in 2012 is paired
with the variety of possibilities of lawyer and client interaction, virtual or
otherwise, that exists today or may exist tomorrow, thoughts about attor-
ney-client relationships expand as well. One can only guess about the pos-
sibilities of interaction in the future. In the 1960s the cartoon, The Jetsons,
portrayed a family of the future complete with video phones and a robot
maid named Rosie. At the time, I am sure that many people thought such
things were simply a figment of the cartoonist's imagination appropriate for
cartoon drivel and nothing else. Yet, today many of us use Skype to talk
with friends and business associates and some of us have robot vacuum
cleaners! Who can say today what is possible in the years ahead? A more
flexible, circumstances and context approach to determining when a lawyer
owes duties to a party, an approach that focuses on the nature of each
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Ky. R. EVID. 503(A)(3); TEX. R. EVID. 503(A)(3). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 (2000) (the privilege applies when the communication involves
a person "who is a lawyer or who the client or prospective client reasonably believes to be a lawyer").
149. See, e.g., United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bay State
Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1989) (client's reasonable belief is "key
question"); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687 (C.D. Cal. 1995). In accord, THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §71 states:
A communication is in confidence with the meaning of [the privilege] if, at the time and in the
circumstances of the communication, the communicating person reasonably believes that no
one will learn the contents of the communication except a privileged person . . . or another
person with whom communications are protected under a similar privilege.
Id. See also Rice, supra note 132, at §6:1.
150. Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 609.
151. Id. ("The notion that Ruehle spoke with [the] attorneys ... with the reasonable belief that his
statements were confidential is unsupported by the record.").
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relationship and its unique facts, an approach that does not unduly focus on
factors developed in situations of long ago, should make dealing with situa-
tions we have yet to imagine easier. Rule 1.18 and its amendments assists
us by suggesting such as approach.
